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ABSTRACT 
This chapter proposes an autonomic computing security framework for protecting cloud-based SCADA 
systems against cyber threats. Autonomic computing paradigm is based on intelligent computing that 
can autonomously take actions under given conditions. These technologies have been successfully 
applied to many problem domains requiring autonomous operations. One such area of national interest 
is SCADA systems that monitor critical infrastructures such as transportation networks, large 
manufacturing, business and health facilities, power generation, and distribution networks. The SCADA 
systems have evolved from isolated systems into a complex, highly connected systems requiring constant 
availability. The migration of such systems from in-house to cloud infrastructures has gradually gained 
prominence. The deployments over cloud infrastructures have brought new cyber security threats, 
challenges and mitigation opportunities. SCADA deployment to cloud makes it imperative to adopt 
newer architectures and measures that can proactively and autonomously react to an impending threat.  
KEYWORDS 
Autonomic computing framework, cloud SCADA, cyber security, communications, critical infrastructures, hybrid cloud 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are used to monitor and control complex 
infrastructures of national importance such as transportation networks, power generation and 
manufacturing plants. SCADA systems can be visualised as a layered architecture, as shown in Figure 1. 
The field devices (sensors, etc.) at the lowest layer interact with the physical processes. At layer 2, the 
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) aggregate data values from 
the lower layer and communicate the commands and their responses through the communications network 
to the SCADA server and Human Machine Interface (HMI). The generation of commands at the top layer 
and collection of responses from the lowest layer results in the monitoring and control of the process. The 
applicability of SCADA systems has become widespread due to industrial automation, cost reduction and 
growth in global economies (Nazir et al., 2017a). 
 Traditionally, SCADA systems were developed as closed systems with security being the overriding 
factor, and no Internet connectivity. Isolation and obscurity as a mechanism for protection is no longer an 
option for critical infrastructures (Mahoney and Gandhi, 2011) because in order to leverage efficiency and 
gain a competitive advantage, the systems are increasingly becoming connected to the Internet and cloud 
technologies. SCADA system security vulnerabilities were first highlighted by the Stuxnet attack 
(Karnouskos, 2011). Subsequently, there has been an increase in the frequency and sophistication, of the 
attacks as evidenced by Constantin (2014). 
 
 Fig. 1. Layered Architecture of a SCADA system. 
 
The SCADA systems deployment to cloud can be configured in many ways, to suit the application. The 
SCADA application could be split over a hybrid cloud especially where the nature of the application 
dictates physical control over critical records such as in medical or finance applications. Also, it may be 
possible to deploy the complete application to the public cloud but a more likely cloud based deployment 
is where the sensors and control devices send the data over to the cloud, which can then be interpreted in 
real time (Larry, 2011). The HMI (Human Machine Interface) could be made available over the cloud for 
both the operator control and visualisation of the data and reporting. SCADA systems deployed on a cloud 
infrastructure could use the cloud providers’ software and integrated tools for data analytics, reporting, 
dashboards and user interface. There are endless possibilities of integrating SCADA systems with cloud 
infrastructure and software (Sam IT Solutions) that can provide many benefits compared to a system hosted 
on a private cloud.  The SCADA system can thus be accessible from anywhere in the world. However, 
such cloud deployments add many levels of complexities. 
 SCADA systems are getting more complex and it is difficult to develop effective defence strategies, as 
there is a lack of understanding of the complex interactions between the many system entities (Khadraoui 
and Feltus, 2015). The systems complexity and interactions go beyond the capability of system developers 
and integrators as a result of interconnectivity (Kephart and Chess, 2003). Thus, increasingly there is a 
lack of understanding of the whole system, which makes it very difficult to tune a system and to make 
decisions in case of changing requirements. This has led to a realization that conventional and inflexible 
security techniques will not help. What is needed is a new way of looking at the problem of cyber security 
that is robust, manageable and self-realising with a minimum requirement for a human operator to monitor 
systems to make intelligent decisions. 
 The complexity of developing and managing computing systems has become an important challenge 
facing the IT industry. The term ‘Autonomic Computing’ was first used by IBM in 2001 to combat the 
looming complexity crisis (Ganek and Corbi, 2003). The concept has been inspired by the human 
biological autonomic nervous system. It relates to intelligent computing platforms that are based on the 
disciplines of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and other innovative technologies. These 
technologies can be used to design systems that mimic the human brain to learn about their environment 
and can autonomously predict an impending anomalous situation. An autonomic system is self-healing, 
self-regulating, self-optimising and self-protecting (Ganek and Corbi, 2003). Therefore, the system should 
be able to protect itself against both malicious attacks and unintended mistakes by the operator. What is 
proposed is an entirely new way of thinking about the problem where the system itself is intelligent and 
helps to maintain and extend its behaviour, with the use of autonomic computing (Kephart and Chess, 
2003). Mallouhi (2011) describes a testbed for SCADA system security through autonomic software 
protection system using different attack scenarios. 
The basic principles of autonomic computing are highly relevant for the protection of the increasingly 
complex cloud based SCADA systems because: (i) the boundaries between physical and virtual systems 
have been blurred through virtualisation. It is possible to host a cluster of machines in a virtual 
environment; (ii) even with hardware there are sufficient advances in other domains with self-healing 
materials; (iii) advances in machine learning, artificial intelligence and the knowledge base need to be 
capitalised for protection; (iv) the systems are highly interconnected and the distributed nature of the 
systems pose an exponential complexity. 
Autonomic computing applications have been developed for use within complex SCADA systems. 
Greer and Rodriguez-Martinez (2012) and Amgai et al., (2014) have discussed the application of 
autonomic computing for smart grids, as a solution to manage system complexities. Key components of a 
self-protecting SCADA system have been proposed and a survey of techniques provided for the realisation 
of such systems (Chen and Abdelwahed, 2014). Also, there are a number of dedicated research groups 
focusing research on the applicability of autonomic computing to cyber security (Autonomic Computing 
Lab; Cloud and Autonomic Computing Centre; Fortes et al., 2014). JADE (JADE) provides a framework 
for building autonomic management systems.  A test bed was developed for modelling critical 
infrastructures for testing autonomic technologies (Autonomic Computing Lab; Cox, 2011).  
We propose to apply the autonomic computing paradigm features to SCADA system security, in 
particular focussing on self-protecting cloud based SCADA systems. This chapter incorporates autonomic 
computing paradigm elements to cloud based SCADA systems to safeguard against the emerging cyber 
security challenges and threats facing cloud based SCADA applications.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Multiple pathways and Internet Connectivity to a Production System. 
 
  
2. CLOUD BASED SCADA SYSTEMS   
2.1 Vulnerabilities and Threat Landscape of SCADA Systems 
 SCADA systems were developed to be used as stand-alone systems, which by their very nature made 
it difficult for an outside attacker to exploit the system. However, the many benefits associated with 
interconnecting the system to the Internet have transformed the SCADA systems into a highly 
interconnected system accessible over the Internet (Fig 2) (Taveras, 2013; Nazir et al., 2017a), resulting 
in an increased exposure to threats. The system interactions are complex, opening new threat entry points 
as there are many third party libraries and hardware assembled with components from around the world, 
with exploitable threats such as backdoors, often unknown to the SCADA system vendor. 
The systems developers design customized solutions to address a particular problem. The systems are 
fairly long term deployments because the controlled processes have large financial and industrial outlays. 
The criticality of maintaining the process means that the systems remain in continuous operation and have 
a range of redundancies incorporated to protect stalling the system for foreseeable problems. 
SCADA communications protocols such as Modbus, Distributed Network Protocol (DNP), IEC 870-5 
and T103 are described by the GE Communications Protocol. Most SCADA communications protocols 
have no encryption as they were designed when the SCADA systems existed only as stand-alone systems, 
rendering protocol authentication unnecessary. The Modbus protocol is one of the most common protocols 
for SCADA systems, which operate on simple request-response messaging (Al Baalbaki et al., 2013). The 
diversity of the protocols and their inoperability also creates obstacles to design secure communications 
(Sheldon et al., 2004). There are many publicly available tools that can capture network traffic wirelessly. 
Also the wireless devices that feed data to the SCADA system provide easy entry points for the intruder 
into the system because the end devices do not have adequate protection, due to very low power 
requirements. 
SCADA application vendors design their software to be hosted on generic operating systems such as 
Windows and Linux variants for widespread deployments. However, this exposes SCADA applications to 
the same vulnerabilities as that of the operating system.  The long operational lifetime of SCADA 
software means that the host operating system may be beyond technical support. Additional features being 
added to SCADA systems add further complexity and the systems become difficult to develop and 
maintain. Thus it becomes difficult to understand and restore systems to their operational state from a 
compromised state resulting from a cyber attack.  
Cyber attack paradigms have progressed much beyond the traditional attack methodologies such as 
man-in-the-middle (MITM) and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks (Chen and Abdelwahed, 2014), and have 
become  sophisticated  to avoid detection. The traditional defence approaches are unable to cope with the 
latest attack methodologies, where for example, the system parameters are altered, and are individually 
legitimate, but on the whole result in system collapse. Correct operation of the system needs not only the 
correct commands but commands that are consistent with the prevailing state of the system. It is possible 
for an attacker to inject a valid sequence of commands that gradually take the system to an unstable 
condition. The systems also operate under very tight timing constraints and can have undesired 
consequences in case of timing violation. Even the smallest intrusions on the critical infrastructure controls, 
can result in malfunctions which have devastating ripple effects on the system as a whole. The system is 
susceptible to attacks with minor effects, which can alter the system behaviour in a negative manner, 
leading to a ripple effect that compromises the whole system. The SCADA system entities are generally 
spread over a large geographical area, thus necessitating synchronisation of information at each location. 
 The threat landscape is rapidly evolving (Khadraoui and Feltus, 2015) and has gained momentum 
because SCADA systems are now accessible over the Internet, and are no longer protected by obscurity as 
the communications protocols and characteristics are available to interested parties. Currently, both the 
state and non-state agents are trying to exploit the system’s vulnerabilities. Cox (2011) discusses threat 
ontologies in detail. 
In contrast to the attacks launched from outside, threats can also emanate from an innocent or deliberate 
mistake from an insider. Such attacks could cause more harm as they could be launched with some 
understanding about the systems operations.  
Cloud infrastructure for data storage, management and processing is becoming popular and being 
adopted by an increasing number of organizations, however cyber security is still a predominant concern 
(Villalobos, 2014). One of the main issues for hosting SCADA in the cloud are the security concerns that 
arise due to resource sharing, communications over public networks, and maintaining data outside the 
organisation’s control (Shahzad et al., 2013). The benefits of utilizing cloud resources for 
telecommunications applications and role of communications between the distributed data centres are 
described in (Vasilenko, 2016). This is important because data security is a major concern for cloud 
applications and is addressed by autonomic computing data monitoring security systems that monitor the 
data changes for potential threats (Zhang, 2018). 
 2.2 Threats and Vulnerabilities of Cloud based Systems 
 
2.2.1 Closed network open to public 
The major threat is that the data and applications deployed to the cloud are accessed over the Internet. 
Thus the closed network protection as in the case of an on-site fully controlled network is no longer 
available. Therefore the advantage of access from anywhere in the world also makes it susceptible to 
attacks from malicious users, such as distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. 
 
2.2.2 Shared Infrastructure 
The cloud vendors do not provide any guarantees that hardware infrastructure would not be shared with 
other businesses. Thus whether the sharing companies or users can be trusted becomes an issue to be 
considered, as there might be competitors sharing the same physical server. The sharing of resources can 
result in many controversies for critical and real-time applications (Ahn and Cheng, 2013). This problem 
can be addressed by having a virtual private cloud. A virtual cloud is housed on a public cloud but it is 
fully segregated and, the company placing its data and applications on the virtual cloud is the only entity 
that has access to all the resources of the virtual cloud to itself.  
 
2.2.3 Communications links  
The communication links connecting a business to the cloud provider network are over the public cloud. 
This exposes the link to cyber attacks. Such issues can be resolved by having a virtual private network 
(VPN) to connect to the cloud infrastructure and use of encryption. 
 
2.2.4 Virtual Machines 
The virtual machines provided by the cloud vendor need to be fully protected and this could be the 
responsibility of the developer depending on the deployment model, if it is the infrastructure-as-a-service 
(IaaS). 
 
2.2.5 Cloud Infrastructure unavailability 
Another threat could be the cloud infrastructure going down and remaining unavailable for an extended 
period. Such an eventuality could have disastrous consequences for a business utilising any service and 
especially for SCADA applications. This would be more relevant where the regulations require holding 
the data in a particular region or data centre. 
 
2.2.6 Insider Attack 
The employees of the cloud provider have full access to the data and espionage or subversion for gains 
with a malicious intent cannot be ruled out. This also could be a result of an innocent mistake resulting in 
loss of access to the SCADA resources. 
 
 
 
2.3  Key Benefits of Cloud Based Systems 
 
 Cloud infrastructures provide many benefits and savings to the businesses including:  
 Cost reduction 
 Availability 
 Internet or browser access 
 Elasticity and Scalability 
 Virtualisation 
 Security 
 Resource Provisioning for storage, compute and networks  
 Global Access 
 Cost savings –Pay-per-use 
 Reliability and Fault resolution. 
 
 2.4 SCADA System Deployment to Cloud 
 The migration of many business systems to the cloud, has taken place due to cost savings, however such 
large scale migration of data is not observed for real-time applications such as SCADA (Ahn and Cheng, 
2013). The business critical nature of SCADA applications makes it a difficult decision for system 
developers, companies and the application users to consider deployment of SCADA to the cloud. However, 
confidence in cloud infrastructure is growing amongst businesses due to confidence in cloud vendors. 
Despite this, SCADA applications must mitigate against time critical communications constraints for 
adequate functioning of the system. The four possible ways of taking advantage of a cloud deployment for 
a SCADA application could be, SCADA HMI and Data Storage in Cloud; Complete SCADA system in 
Cloud; Hybrid cloud SCADA; and  Public versus Virtual Private Cloud. 
2.4.1 SCADA HMI and Data Storage in Cloud 
 The SCADA application runs on-site, whereas the information can be stored and displayed in the cloud 
with the control network providing data to the SCADA server. This is a common configuration and 
provides remote access and visualisation of data (Larry, 2011).  A system based on Message Queue 
Telemetry Transport (MQTT) which is a publish/subscribe model protocol (Nazir and Kaleem, 2019) is 
proposed by Siemens SCADA WinCC OA (Siemens) for Industry 4.0 where IoT data can be populated 
through MQTT broker to the cloud. The data resides in the cloud database and has the resulting advantage: 
 Data is available globally 
 Can be easily replicated on to different server 
 The interface can be connected to and from anywhere in the world 
 Data analytics from the cloud vendor is available for visualization. 
2.4.2 Complete SCADA system in Cloud 
 The SCADA application runs in the cloud but has remote connections to sensors and control devices. This 
configuration may suit a distributed SCADA system with PLC, RTU feeding data to SCADA servers in 
the cloud (Larry, 2011). A performance comparison of an entire SCADA system in the cloud environment 
for cost and security is described by Shahzad et al. (2013). The security threats considered were attacks on 
VM, inter VM attacks, and denial of service.  
2.4.3 Hybrid cloud SCADA  
 A hybrid cloud is a composite cloud where some of the application resides on a private cloud and the 
remaining can be migrated to the public cloud as required depending on different contingencies, for 
example, in case of an overload or organisational requirements. A scenario could be that the more critical 
and confidential information is maintained in the private cloud, whereas the public cloud could be 
optionally used to absorb additional processing and storage. The migration of application and data to the 
public cloud due to an overload is known as cloud burst. 
2.4.4 Public versus Virtual Private Cloud 
A virtual private cloud is an infrastructure housed on public cloud but from the access perspective it is like 
a private cloud, that is, an organization getting the cloud services has dedicated and exclusive access to the 
cloud resources. 
3. COGNITIVE INFORMATICS AND AUTONOMIC COMPUTING 
3.1 Cognitive Informatics 
Cognitive Informatics is a broad and multidisciplinary field of cognition and information sciences that 
investigates the human information processing and its applicability for computing applications. A 
comprehensive review of the cognitive informatics framework is provided by Wang (2007a) and it also 
describes the applications from the fields of computing and software engineering. It can have diverse goals 
based on the application field but the overriding aim is to improve the human-machine interaction through 
better decision-making. For example, object recognition and classification problems in computer vision 
are hard for computers but come naturally to humans, where a lot of progress has been made by mimicking 
the cognitive processes of the brain through Artificial Neural Networks (ANN). Similarly, the application 
of machine learning and agent based processing can help overcome the cyber threats facing SCADA 
systems. 
 Cognitive computing comprises of intelligent computing methodologies to build autonomous systems 
that mimic the inference mechanisms of the human brain (Wang, 2009). Thus a system can detect 
anomalies, events and entities in a system through pattern recognition and data mining. These pro-active 
and self-learning systems can provide an effective defence against cyber threats, as signature based 
approaches can only work against known threats.  
 The advances in the field of cognitive informatics have led to the development of cognitive computing. 
Computing can be classified at four levels of computation intelligence: data, information, knowledge, and 
intelligence (Wang et al., 2011c; 2015). Data and information processing have been well studied but the 
same is not been the case for the higher levels of computational intelligence. The trends in “Cognitive 
processes of the brain, particularly the perceptive cognitive processes, are the fundamental means for 
describing autonomic computing systems, such as robots, software agent systems, and distributed 
intelligent networks.” (Wang, 2007b).  
3.2 Autonomic Computing Paradigm 
 Autonomic Computing is one of the trans-disciplinary applications of Cognitive Informatics and an 
autonomic computing system using its intelligence can autonomously carry out its actions based on the set 
of events and goals (Wang, 2007a; 2007b). This contrasts with an imperative system whose behaviour is 
controlled by a stored program and is thus deterministic. The motivation for autonomic systems is to deal 
with the system complexity, which has reached an overwhelming proportion and is inspired by the human 
nervous system (Poslad, 2011). 
The increase in system complexity and applications heterogeneity has made it difficult to process the 
information. This has necessitated the use of paradigms inspired by biological systems such as autonomic 
computing (Parashar and Hariri, 2005) that have a goal to realise systems and applications, which operate 
autonomously based on high level rules to meet the system mission.  It differs from Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) in that unlike those systems the humans may take the ultimate decision. 
As the size and complexity of an application grows so should the software to control it, to become more 
flexible and dynamic, so as to be self-managed (Kramer and Magee, 2007). Designing such systems is the 
real challenge. The basic idea of the Autonomic Computing paradigm is that the system should be 
sufficiently intelligent to enable it to develop and maintain itself in an optimised state. The research 
challenges of autonomic computing are described by Kephart (2005). The human body’s feedback and 
control mechanisms (Kephart and Chess, 2003; Parashar and Hariri, 2005) have formed the basis of general 
systems theory and holism for the development and management of computer based systems. The 
autonomic computing paradigm mimics the human autonomic nervous system. The ability to self-manage 
SCADA system security threats by developing learning systems that recognise vulnerabilities will be 
hugely advantageous. The agents and software services will form a part of the systems, gathering data and 
monitoring systems continuously (Yang et al., 2012).  
 
3.3 Autonomic Computing Features 
Autonomic computing can be developed using different technologies; however an autonomic system 
must demonstrate the following four main features: self-configuring; self-healing; self-optimising; and 
self-protecting (Ganek and Corbi, 2003):  
1) Self-configuring: The system must be able to reconfigure its behaviour based on the changing system 
requirements. For example, to acquire more system resources, such as memory, in case the system is 
overburdened. 
2) Self-healing: In response to detecting a compromised element in its configuration, or lack of 
resources, an autonomic system can respond by repairing itself to a good state. Based on this assessment 
the system should be able to, for example, isolate the system components that have been compromised 
and continue operation with the remaining elements and at the same time attempting to restore the 
compromised system elements. 
3) Self-optimising: The system must be able to assess the current state of the system variables and be 
able to tune them resulting in an optimised tuned behaviour. This is crucial, especially in the case of 
complex systems where there are thousands of system parameters that can affect the system performance. 
For best results knowing or applying them all in a reasonable amount of time, is beyond the grasp of the 
human mind.  
4) Self-protecting: The system should be aware of the normal system operation and be able to 
continuously monitor the current system state to determine when deviations occur. It can then take 
measures to contain the threat and to handle it.  
Autonomic computing facilitates identifying factors that relate to a specific state – homeostasis. The 
development of a knowledge network helps to identify what ‘homeostasis’ is and when there is an 
imbalance, to understand the structure of the network, the defences, the threats and the attacks.  The 
threats can be classified into two categories: 1) process-related: when valid credentials are used to make 
legitimate changes that can impact on industrial processes. These can also be due to an error in the input 
of incorrect values or an actual attack (Crawford, 2006) for example, by disgruntled employees; and 2) 
system-related: which are exploited via software or configuration vulnerabilities. For example, flaws in 
communication protocols, which are low level (layers 1 and 2) attacks on the SCADA architecture 
(Pidikiti et al., 2013).  Developing a mechanism to mine logged data on process-related incidents is a 
potential solution to developing an autonomic computing approach for SCADA security. Identifying user 
activities and classifying the actions into signed-on or known user actions allows the analysis of threats 
as legitimate system commands by legitimate users, or by illegitimate users, to distinguish the threats into 
attacks or errors by developing a knowledge base (Hadžiosmanović et al., 2012). The open issues and 
challenges of autonomic computing covering the industrial and academic systems are provided by Salehie 
and Tahvildari (2005). All autonomic computing features are important but self-healing is important for 
cloud deployments, whereas self-configuration and self-optimization can be controlled through policies 
by the system users (Karakostas, 2014). 
3.4 Autonomic Computing to Secure SCADA 
 Some recent technology adoptions and improvements in SCADA systems are promising to aid 
developing systems that can result in an autonomic SCADA system. System protection can be ensured 
through many techniques. The majority depend on the judgement of a human to provide safeguards for the 
system.  
 The latest trends and innovations, such as virtualisation, analytics and databases, and wireless 
communications, which must work together in close collaboration to achieve the system mission, have 
been applied to SCADA systems. The integrated framework can rightly be called systems of systems as 
the complexity has increased beyond simple control and monitoring tasks, the fundamental basis of 
SCADA. This complexity implies that developing and maintaining such systems are reaching the limits of 
human cognition (Kephart and Chess, 2003; Huebscher and McCann, 2008). 
System vendors have been cognisant of the prevailing cyber security environment and have added a 
number of features to the product offerings. These features include, for example multiplexing proxy, 
encryption and role based access to make the intruder’s task difficult. Most SCADA vendors allow 
integration with relational databases in addition to the built-in historical databases that have some 
advantages (SQL: The Next Big Thing in SCADA). Relational databases such as Oracle have their own 
integrated analytics and data mining services that can make it easier to uncover any anomalous activity. 
A review of machine learning techniques for outlier detection of different temporal data sets is provided 
in Gupta et al., (2014). Machine learning and data analytics techniques have revolutionised many 
application domains and have recently been introduced in SCADA applications software. Such native 
integration makes it easier for the SCADA developers to analyse the systems operations and identify 
impending attacks (Kirsch et al., 2014; Carcano et al., 2011). Machine learning and other such techniques 
can effectively analyse a system to detect anomalous activities. Such unsupervised anomaly detection 
schemes are more appropriate and efficient compared to human analysts (Jiang and Yasakethu, 2013) and 
other signature based approaches (Chen and Abdelwahed, 2014). The system can thus learn new 
approaches and provide defence against as yet unseen scenarios, as in the case of supervised learning 
approaches. The other techniques of interest could be based on agent based, artificial intelligence, and 
adaptive systems (Greer and Rodriguez-Martinez, 2012). The future of cyber security lies with exploiting 
such techniques that can not only autonomously assess the threats to the system security, but also contain 
and mitigate the threat from spreading. The operator alert can notify the human operator to initiate disaster 
recovery operations. 
 Virtualisation techniques provide many benefits that can advantageously be applied to support the 
autonomic computing paradigm. Virtualisation enables easy containment of an attack, restoring and 
disaster recovery, change and optimisation of system resources, etc., in a truly elastic manner. 
A recent breakthrough in this direction is that of the Autonomic Computing paradigm. With Autonomic 
Computing, the ultimate control still rests with a human but the drudgery of data manipulation and threat 
assessment can be taken out of the loop. An autonomic system can automatically detect and fix anomalies, 
which help reduce human intervention (Ahad et al., 2015). An autonomic cloud manager autoJuJu is 
proposed by Karakostas (2014) that makes autonomous decisions for scaling up or down the number of 
VMs, showing how the proposed manager meets self-configuration and self-optimization by considering 
broad policies and rules for cloud deployment, running in a sense-plan-act loop. 
4. AUTONOMIC ARCHITECTURE FOR SECURING CLOUD BASED SCADA 
SYSTEMS 
 In this section we provide a brief overview of the architectures proposed in the research literature and 
propose a framework that can be used to design SCADA systems that have built-in layered protection 
against both known and unknown threats. We also provide details of the autonomic computing SCADA 
architecture proposed by the authors (Nazir et al., 2017b). 
4.1 Autonomic SCADA Architecture 
Some autonomic architectures have been proposed in the research literature. The IBM autonomic 
computing system comprises, monitoring, analysing, planning, executing and a knowledge base 
component (Ebbers et al., 2006) and was proposed for large-scale commercial systems. The architecture 
utilises Touchpoint Autonomic Managers that are self-configuring, self-healing, self-optimizing and self-
protecting.  
An introduction to autonomic computing together with the challenges and opportunities are presented 
in Parashar and Hariri (2005). They propose architecture for an autonomic element as a smallest functional 
unit and propose a manager for each autonomic element. Chen and Abdelwahed (2014) highlight the need 
for better security for the SCADA system and present an autonomic security model comprising of risk 
assessment, early warning and prevention, intrusion detection, and intrusion response.   
An autonomic computational intelligence based system suitable for big data was proposed for 
identifying cyber attacks on smart grids by Demertzis and Iliadis (2018). Real-time control and monitoring 
of smart grid through cloud framework was proposed in (Kulkarni, 2019) that helped early detection of 
grid failures, user verification, and prevention of grid failure from anywhere in the world. A cloud based 
autonomic framework for smart grid that analyses the user social media and sensor data for energy demand 
for household is proposed considering it as a big data problem (Qin, 2014).  A multilevel user access 
control layer was proposed for cloud platform security hosting SCADA system accessible through services 
via service oriented architecture (Baker, 2015). A detailed survey of autonomic computing models and 
applications is provided by Huebscher and McCann (2008). An Autonomic Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (ACIP) system using anomaly detection and autonomic computing is proposed by Al-Baalbaaki 
and Al-Nashif (2013). The modular system has online monitoring, feature selection and correlation, multi-
level behaviour analysis, visualisation, and adaptive learning. The evaluation of ACIP is described using 
Modbus traffic generator for the Modbus traces between a server and five different PLCs. The proposed 
system could detect and stop a variety of attacks on the Modbus protocol (Al-Baalbaaki and Al-Nashif, 
2013). An autonomic computing architecture for a virtual private cloud to house real-time medical 
applications is proposed in (Ahn and Cheng 2013) by considering a distributed VM monitoring system for 
a virtual private cloud. 
 Autonomic computing for intrusion detection in cloud using big data through an intrusion response 
autonomic system using Hadoop for data organization and Map-Reduce for data extraction can provide 
self-awareness, self-configuration and self-healing in the cloud (Vieira, 2014). An intrusion detection 
system was proposed for self-healing in cloud infrastructure through trade-offs for performance and energy 
response where VMs can be replaced in case of attacks (Villalobos, 2014). It was shown that by 
incorporating knowledge of a physical model of the system it was possible to identify the attacks through 
changes in system behaviour (Cardenas et al., 2011). The detection of attacks was formulated as an 
anomaly-based intrusion detection. The results show that the response algorithm keeps the system in a safe 
state during an attack. Automatic response mechanisms were proposed on system state estimation.  
However, they caution that an automatic detection and response methodology might not be applicable for 
all processes in control systems.  
A methodology for designing a smart critical architecture that protects communications, controls and 
computations using moving target defence and autonomic computing is proposed by Hariri et al. (2017) 
who also developed a Resilient Smart Critical Infrastructure Testbed (RSCIT). A general autonomic 
computing environment (Autonomia) was developed for control and management of smart critical 
infrastructures.  
A survivable cyber-secure infrastructure (SCI) architecture is proposed by Sheldon et al. (2004) for a 
power grid and proposes a cognitive agent architecture combining agent-based and autonomic computing. 
Cognitive components are described as comprising of processes that are reactive, deliberate, or reflective. 
4.2 Proposed Architecture 
An autonomic system enables a SCADA system to optimise, configure and protect itself in case of 
changing the system state to a compromised one. The work to date for securing SCADA security focuses 
on discrete approaches.  
The authors had proposed an integrated approach that combines, the discrete knowledge based 
approaches with cognitive approaches. The memory layer of the Layered Reference Model of the Brain 
(LRMB) (layer 2) reflects the knowledge base that captures the short term, long term and transient 
memories. This can be utilised to capture process- and systems-related threats. Memory can be defined as 
a set of subconscious cognitive processes that retain the external or internal information about various 
SCADA security events. The subconscious knowledge base is inherited from the range of events and 
threats identified, and the conscious subsystem, however, is acquired and flexible, based on the autonomic 
computing paradigm (Wang et al., 2006a; Wang and Wang, 2006b).  
In contrast to the architectures above, our proposed architecture combines three features to provide a 
threat-resilient SCADA framework: (i) virtualisation of computing and networking resources (ii) hierarchy 
of autonomic managers (AMs) to identify threats at different scales (iii) protection against false alarms. In 
the following sections we describe the autonomic manager element and the corresponding autonomic 
SCADA architecture. 
4.2.1 Autonomic Manager 
Virtualisation refers to creating a virtual rather than physical version of computer hardware, storage and 
networks. The advantages are that the computing resources can be elastically assigned as required and it is 
much easier to monitor the virtual machines. In case of a cyber attack, a clean instance can be easily 
launched and the compromised machine can be isolated for forensics. Also, disaster recovery and rollback 
can be performed easily.  We propose hosting the SCADA system on a virtual platform. The advantages 
are that it can provide high availability through protection against hardware and software failures. Thus 
creating a broad generalised structure based on virtualisation wherein appropriate technologies can be 
selected to best suit an application within the given framework. 
We propose the concept of hierarchical autonomic managers that can scale protection from a small to a 
wide area. A domain autonomic manager, 𝐴𝑀𝑑 performs real-time analysis of their limited domain 
(database, communications, etc.,) at a small scale. These domain-based analyses are then aggregated at the 
local system level, 𝐴𝑀𝑙 for identification of anomalies to counter the threats locally. This relieves the central 
autonomic manager, 𝐴𝑀𝑐 to take more holistic actions. Thus, a central autonomic manager can perform an 
analysis of system wide aggregated analysis to counter system wide variations to identify possible threats. 
Thus, the inference of AM is based on the intelligent aggregation of the inferences of its lower level 
AM. 
Inferences 𝐴𝑀𝑐 = ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝐴𝑀𝑙
𝑁
𝑖=1  
We argue that despite the current state-of-the-art in autonomic computing applications, such as, 
machine learning and neural networks applied to SCADA systems, the ultimate decision should lie with 
the human operator. This is due to the criticality of the SCADA applications that might jeopardise the 
safety and health of people, or compromise national security and infrastructures in case of false alarms. 
This of course, will vary from one application to another and a human decision-maker could be in the loop 
at some or all layers of AMs. The hierarchy of autonomic managers abstracts the information as it proceeds 
from low to high levels (domain to global) and can recommend actions to make it easier for a human 
operator to make a decision. 
 The structure and execution cycle of an AM is shown in Fig 3. It is planned and executed based on the 
given goals and rules. The execution starts at plan stage, followed by evaluate stage which could be 
monitoring or comparison, to determine a condition to be an anomaly or a progression towards one, 
inferring the threat, and reporting the inference to its higher AM. The knowledge base is analogous to the 
human nervous system storing structured and unstructured information used by the autonomic manager 
during its operation.   
 
  
Fig 3. Structure and execution cycle of an autonomic manager. 
 
 The autonomic manager, as shown in Fig 3, can be used at various security layers of the system. The 
hierarchy helps to place the inferences at appropriate levels and the intelligence can travel up to the highest 
layer, that is, the central AM.  
4.2.2 Autonomic SCADA Architecture for a Non-cloud Deployment 
 A SCADA system can have a large geographical spread, exposing it to exploitation at many locations, 
therefore necessitating an autonomic manager at each location that can monitor the security in the local 
areas and coordinate the efforts through the central manager. A simplified SCADA system architecture is 
shown in Figure 4. At the heart of the system is a central autonomic manager that can enforce the broad 
threat mitigation and containment policies in the managed system, as defined by the system administrator. 
The knowledge base provides the various historical system models that are continuously modified to the 
current state and are analysed to check conformance. The local autonomic managers continually observe 
the system state and act promptly in case of identified security threats to the local system. 
Our proposed architecture provides a broad generalised structure based on virtualisation wherein 
appropriate technologies can be selected to best suit an application within the given framework. The 
identification of anomalies at an area level helps to counter the threats locally, relieving the central 
autonomic manager to take more holistic actions to counter system wide threats. 
 
  
Fig 4. Proposed Architecture for an autonomic SCADA system. 
The autonomic computing system incorporated to monitor a SCADA system may generate false alarms 
and therefore it may be necessary, based on the application domain, for a human operator to make a final 
decision based on the evidence.   
It is also pertinent to point out here that the autonomic manager itself can be the target of a cyber attack. 
Such exploitation can be avoided through redundant deployments of managers and an integrated approach 
as proposed. 
4.2.3 Cloud based Autonomic Framework for SCADA Security  
The aim is to propose a generalised framework that can be helpful of deployment of autonomic SCADA 
applications to the cloud. The objective is to protect the SCADA deployment against cyber attacks and in 
doing so continuously evaluate any imminent breaches. In case of breaches the steps are taken to contain 
the breach and to restore the system to its pre-compromise state. The framework makes use of machine 
learning and data analytic techniques to quickly identify an attack vector. 
The virtual machines provide many benefits to house a SCADA system, in case of any compromise it 
can quickly be restored to safe state. Such redundant applications can be run so that in case of a compromise 
of one, the other can continue to operate. Virtualization also makes it possible for a running application to 
migrate to another server, a phenomenon known as ‘Live Migration’. This could be very helpful if the 
server itself is compromised and there are dangers of process disruption.  
 This work proposes the application of autonomic computing paradigm to cloud based deployments of 
SCADA applications. The timing constraints and real time nature of information dictates a hybrid cloud 
where the more critical elements could be deployed off-site in a private cloud and less critical elements 
could be housed in the public cloud. The framework proposed is generic enough so that it can be made use 
of for different types of SCADA applications and deployment domains. 
 A high-level cloud-based autonomic computing framework to secure SCADA systems is proposed as 
shown in Figure 5. We propose the hosting of SCADA systems on a hybrid cloud where the SCADA server 
is placed on an on-premises private cloud and the Human Machine Interface (HMI) on the public cloud. 
The control devices such as PLC provide data to the SCADA server running on the on-premises private 
cloud.  
 A strong protection against cyber threats is possible by integrating the security features of the selected 
cloud and SCADA system with the hosting organisation’s customised security features. Public clouds 
provide many features for security and disaster recovery such as two-factor authentication, access keys, 
data backup, and security groups (acts as firewall).  For example, a Denial of Service (DoS) attack can be 
detected and contained through the use of cloud load balancer. The SCADA application provides a 
heartbeat mechanism used for continuous monitoring of different software and hardware entities in the 
system, for failure through a timeout mechanism. An absence of heartbeat signal could result in an  
 
 
 
 
Fig 5. Proposed cloud-based autonomic computing architecture for SCADA system. 
 
automatic invocation of redundant SCADA servers in cases of detection of problems with the primary 
server or could also be flagged for the attention of the human operator.   
 As shown in Fig. 5, Virtual Machine Monitors (VMM) or hypervisors on multiple host servers 
(hardware) can counteract a cyber threat by restoring a VM from a snapshot or backup. The active or 
primary SCADA application is run together with a secondary or standby server that has same state as 
primary server and can take over in case of problems with the primary server. The public cloud 
environment inherently provides redundancy and failover but with the proposed hybrid deployment some 
failover mechanisms would have to be provisioned in the on-premises cloud. For example, a redundant 
Internet connection could safeguard against the only connection going down (Larry, 2011).  
 A VPN is used to connect the SCADA database in the on-premises cloud with the HMI on the public 
cloud. For security and to avoid sharing of cloud resources with other users, we propose the use of a virtual 
private cloud (VPC) within the public cloud. HMI could be accessed over the public Internet through 
Internet connected devices. Access control rules based on Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, location or 
protocols can be used for added security. 
 The autonomous operation of the SCADA server in the cloud infrastructure is based on a set of rules 
and policies that are continuously controlled and monitored through the autonomic manager for cyber 
security. The autonomic manager through machine learning techniques can detect once a value is beyond 
a specified threshold or can detect outliers by considering many attribute values together. Based on the 
specified rules and policies a failure detected by an autonomic manager could automatically contain that 
attack by activating a redundant system, or automatically prevent an attack by updating the encryption 
algorithms.  
 The autonomic manager is proposed for use with all devices and software that are processing or 
communicating the data, and reporting detected threats to the central AM for decision making. The 
autonomic cloud based SCADA infrastructure protects itself autonomously against security threats. The 
threat detection is basically a binary classification process, but where decision is not robust (probability of 
threat) it can be referred to the human operator for review or decision-making. Thus, the proposed 
architecture also results in an added benefit of reducing direct operators’ involvement to continuously 
analyse the cyber threats. 
5. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter has proposed a cloud based autonomic framework for protecting SCADA systems 
deployed to the clouds. We propose the concept of hierarchical autonomic managers that help to extract, 
aggregate and refine intelligent inferences for ultimate decision making by a human operator. The proposed 
framework is generic and can be suitably applied across a range of real-world SCADA applications. The 
importance of the need to have such frameworks has arisen due to a gradual recognition that the cloud 
deployments provide enormous benefits to SCADA systems. The evolving cyber threat landscape dictates 
changes to cyber defence approaches for the protection of SCADA systems in the cloud. Unlike the 
traditional defence approaches where the response is governed by tailoring and monitoring according to 
threats, the concept of autonomic computing provides an advantage, as the systems are self-protecting.  
 Thus, the autonomic computing paradigm is very promising to develop SCADA system cyber security 
architectures that facilitate proactive threat mitigation methodologies, without an active intervention by a 
human operator. The autonomous nature enables flexible and scalable solutions across a wide range of 
SCADA system architectures and applications. In future, the end deployments of cloud such as fog 
computing and cloudlets can be explored that make it possible to migrate the complete SCADA application 
to the cloud without compromising the strict timing constraints of the SCADA applications. Such 
deployments would also be aided by the widespread deployments of 5G networks that provide better 
reliability and high data rates for the wireless connection. 
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